Experiments at UAA are currently run by faculty from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds. Successful experimental programs elsewhere build on faculty participation from a broad range of disciplinary perspectives. 

Currently, the lab provides free services to UAA faculty wishing to run research or teaching experiments.

We invite all interested faculty to contact us  to learn more about experimental methods and how they may be used to address focused research questions. We are also happy to provide assistance in conducting classroom teaching experiments.  

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Protocol 

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Scheduling/ Upcoming experiments

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Ongoing /Completed Experiments

Sharman Haley

“Fairness, Information and Coalition Building in Tax Policy: An Experimental Approach”

Many US states have fallen into deficit and are seeking ways to develop new fiscal resources. The current dilemma in Alaska and other states centers on what kind of tax--income taxes, sales taxes or head taxes--might be agreed upon and in what proportions. However, there is little information related to how voting coalitions form to adopt tax policies and what the public will accept as fair. Experimental methods can help us address this dilemma. Our paper discusses the existing literature at the intersection of public choice, tax policy preferences and experimental social science methods that frames an experimental research agenda. Second, it presents a set of hypotheses about the tax policy preferences we expect to see in our experiments based on this literature. Lastly, it describes our tax policy experiment and presents the results of our first set of trials focusing on the effects of information on tax policy preferences and policy choices by majority vote and determinants and dynamics of voting behavior. We conclude with an outlook for future research. A draft version of the paper is available on request.

 
Lee Huskey and Wayne Edwards

“Job Search with an External Opportunity”

In the economics literature migration studies are concentrated in field experiments rather than laboratory environments. In our research, we address the question of migration through job search experiments conducted in an economic laboratory setting, thereby expanding the experimental literature on migration. To date we have run roughly 8 experimental sessions. When planned experiments are completed, the data generated will be analyzed and subjected to statistical testing to determine whether significant inferences can be made.

The operative question concerns whether the subject searches longer if he or she has an external opportunity (i.e., is allowed to “migrate” to an external labor market) compared to a situation where no external opportunity exists (i.e., the subject is “place-bound”). A result consistent with the Harris-Todaro model would be subjects searching longer with an external opportunity, thereby creating persistent unemployment.

Our experimental design begins with a well known experimental job search design (Cox and Oaxaca, 1992) and is modified to suit our specific purposes. Subjects in the experiment face a series of simple questions. In the baseline case, the subject will “search” for a job in a single market. The subject first faces a random draw to determine whether a job offer exists. If an offer does exist, the amount of the job offer is determined by another random draw. The subject then chooses to accept the job and take the payment, or refuse the job payment and search in another round. The subject can search a limited number of times before exhausting all possible job opportunities. The objective of the subject is to maximize his or her incentive payment. Should an early job offer be accepted or should the subject wait for another offer that might be higher? The subjects will be paid in cash at the end of each experiment in order to satisfy requirements for induced value.

We have run both baseline experiments (no external opportunity) and treatment-effect experiments (external opportunity, unemployment compensation, varying unemployment rates, etc.). When experiments are complete, the baseline experimental results will be compared to the treatment-effect experiments and subjected to statistical analysis to determine whether the behavior is significantly different.

Gunnar Knapp

“Rent Dissipation in Limited Entry Fisheries with Aggregate Quotas: An Experimental Analysis”

This paper reports on an economic experiment conducted to examine the nature of rent dissipation in limited entry fisheries with aggregate quotas, and factors affecting fishermen's political support for changing to individual quota management.  The experimental subjects are “fishermen” who participate in a series of fishing “seasons.”  The experiment assumes that (a) managers limit aggregate harvests each season to a total quota; (b) individual fishermen’s shares of the total catch are positively related to their share of total fishing expenditures; (c) individual fishermen’s shares of the total catch are positively related to their assigned fishing “skill,” and (d) rents are dissipated to the extent that total expenditures exceed the minimum necessary to catch the total quota.  Total quotas and fish prices-which together determine the catch value-vary between seasons. 

After only a few seasons, subjects dissipate almost all potential rents by increasing expenditures to try to increase their shares of the rents.  Increases in prices lead to increased rent dissipation; lower prices lead to reduced rent dissipation.  Heterogeneity of fishing skill reduces the extent of rent dissipation, as fishing becomes relatively less profitable for less skilled participants. More skilled participants capture larger rents. 

 After gaining experience with a “fishery” without individual quotas, subjects vote on whether to switch to individual quota (IQ) management.  Subjects are more likely to vote for individual quotas the higher their quota allocations.  Heterogeneity of fishing skill, by increasing the heterogeneity of catches and the rents captured by skilled fishermen without IQs, reduces the likelihood that IQ allocations based on historical catches will be supported by a majority of fishermen.  Implementation of IQs quickly reduces rent dissipation to almost zero. A draft version of the paper will be available on request.

 
Lance Howe

“Common Pool Resource Management and the Effect of Heterogeneous Users: an Experimental Investigation”

Given appropriate institutions (be they formal or informal rules), locally managed common pool resources (CPR’s) are often found flourishing, often in the presence of significant user differences. At the same time, without appropriate institutions, user heterogeneity in wealth or the value placed on the common-pool resource may lead to relatively less efficient or possibly “dismal” outcomes. In spite of the important role heterogeneity plays in use of CPR’s, the literature provides limited insight into the effect of specific institutions. This research builds on and integrates existing experimental studies in order to explore the role of heterogeneity on CPR management in light of a monitoring and sanctioning institution.

 We have run 10 controlled experiments over the past year, 6 of these have been conducted with subjects at UAA and 4 have been conducted with undergraduate student subjects at UCLA. The draft paper, available on request, centers around addressing three questions or hypotheses: H1.) heterogeneous endowments reduce efficient CPR outcomes relative to homogeneous endowments; H2.) the opportunity to monitor and sanction reduces inefficiency in CPR environments with user heterogeneity; H3.) unanticipated changes in endowments lead to relatively less efficient outcomes compared to anticipated changes.

We find that in a “no-rules” environment, actual efficiency exceeds predicted Nash efficiency and efficiency outcomes exceed those reported in other studies, evidence inconsistent with H1. Second we find that the opportunity to monitor and sanction improves efficiency, even when sanctions are designed in such a way as not to affect predicted Nash play, evidence consistent with H2. Furthermore, efficiency earnings especially increase for low endowment players and inequality declines. Finally, we observe much lower efficiency outcomes with the endowment switch and prior information about the endowment switch doesn’t appear to improve efficiency.